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Abstract 
The pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) of managers of closed-end funds is explicitly 
specified in their contracts as the marginal rate of the funds’ net asset value. Using a sample 
of US closed-end funds from 2006 to 2009, this paper investigates the relationship between 
the PPS and risk-taking behaviors of fund managers. After controlling for endogeneity, we 
find that fund return volatility and fund PPS positively determine each other. Furthermore, 
the positive relationship is more pronounced for closed-end funds engaging in alternative 
investments or in emerging markets.  
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1 Introduction 
According to Morningstar’s fund database, more than 2,700 closed-end funds were listed by 
the end of June 2010, amounting to more than $800 billion. Over all the years in our sample, 
the average management compensation for a closed-end fund is $3.72 million. The 
management compensation for a closed-end fund is usually specified either as a single 
percentage of the underlying net asset value (NAV)c or as multiple marginal rates applied to 
different bands of the underlying NAV.d Despite its importance, significant size and unique 
institutional features, the managerial incentive compensation of closed-end funds remains 
under-researched. This paper sheds light on the issue by investigating the relationship 
between pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) in the management contract, and risk-taking 
behavior, for the closed-end fund industry. 
 
Performance-related pay is viewed as incentive compensation designed to resolve the 
principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers. CEO compensation at 
conventional firms normally includes a fixed salary plus stock options. Gillan, Hartzell and 
Parrino (2009) suggest that the overall CEO compensation structure for firms in the S&P 500 
is not specified in the contract for the entire life of the firm. Therefore, previous literature on 
conventional firms normally estimates PPS using linear regressions on the actual ex post 
                                                                 
c The typical management contract for a closed-end fund with a single marginal compensation rate is as follows: 
“The fund will pay a management fee at an annual rate of 0.75% of the fund’s average weekly net assets , calculated weekly 
and payable on the first business day of each month”. In this paper, we use the fixed annual rate as the applicable marginal 
compensation rate (fund PPS), instead of using the fixed rate multiplied by the average of weekly net asset values. 
d The typical management contract for a closed-end fund with multiple marginal compensation rates is as follows: 
“The fund will pay a management fee at the annual rate of 0.65% of the fund's average weekly managed assets for up to 
$200 million, 0.60% of managed assets between $200 million and $500 million and 0.55% for managed assets in excess of 
$500 million, calculated weekly and payable on the first business day of each month”. In this paper, we use the fixed annual 
rate that applies to the actual NAV in that year as the applicable marginal compensation rate (fund PPS), instead of using the 
fixed rate multiplied by the average of weekly net asset values.  
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compensation provided to the CEO and other executive directors (see Jensen and Murphy 
1990; Hall and Liebman 1998; Aggarwal and Samwick 2002; Jin 2002; Dee, Lulseged and 
Nowlin 2005). By contrast, the compensation paid to the fund manager of a closed-end fund 
is explicitly specified in the management contract, which is renewed each year at the annual 
general meeting. Although an open-ended mutual fund has a similar management 
compensation structure, its fund size varies not only with the fund performance but also with 
the continuous new issues and redemptions of outstanding shares. The applicable marginal 
compensation rate (percentage-of-assets) in the management contract is not an appropriate 
proxy for a mutual fund’s PPS. In comparison, the number of outstanding shares in a 
closed-end fund are normally fixed after the IPO. The change in the underlying NAV of a 
closed-end fund mainly results from its investment performance, rather than from new 
investments or the redeeming of shares. Accordingly, the applicable marginal compensation 
rate defined in the management contract is the most appropriate proxy of the fund manager’s 
PPS for a closed-end fund (see Coles, Suay and Woodbury 2000; Deli 2002). Consequently,  
the closed-end fund industry provides a useful experimental environment in which to use the  
applicable marginal compensation rate in the management contract as a good proxy for the 
fund PPS.  
 
The relation between risk-taking and managerial incentives is of primary importance, 
because an efficient management compensation contract should make a trade-off between the 
correct managerial incentives (PPS) and the optimal amount of risk  sharing by executives 
(see Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987). Smith and Stulz (1985) assume that the utility function 
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of risk-averse executives is a concave function of the expected wealth, and that shareholders 
utilize the compensation structure to change the risk tolerance of executives. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first study on whether and how a fund’s PPS and its risk-taking 
behavior determine each other in the closed-end fund industry. 
 
In this study, we examine the full sample of 2,351 fund-year observations for US 
closed-end funds traded at any time between 2006 and 2009. In the sample, 19.1% of funds 
invest in alternative assets, and 5.9% invest in emerging markets; 33.8% of fund-years have 
multiple marginal rates (concave contracts), while 66.2% of fund-years have a single 
marginal rate (linear contracts). For a fund with multiple marginal rates in the contract, the 
PPS is the marginal rate that applies to the actual NAV in that year. A fund’s investment risk 
is measured by its NAV return volatility.  
 
To account for the endogenous relationship between fund risk-taking behavior and fund 
PPS, we apply simultaneous equation models to investigate how these two factors are jointly 
determined. We find that fund risk has a significantly positive impact on fund PPS, which 
confirms the prediction of the managerial ownership model but is contrary to the implications 
of the standard principal-agent model. Also, fund PPS imposes a significantly positive effect 
on the level of fund risk, which proves that, in the closed-end fund industry, out of the two 
incentives provided by PPS, the increase in the value of the fund manager’s portfolio 
outweighs the negative effect of increased volatility on the manager’s expected utility.  
Moreover, the positive relationship between fund return volatility and fund PPS is stronger 
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for closed-end funds that make alternative investments or invest in emerging markets. 
 
This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, it contributes to the 
work of fund compensation such as Coles, Suay and Woodbury (2000) and Deli (2002). 
Second, it adds to the work done on the risk-taking of funds, by researchers such as Buraschi, 
Kosowski and Sritrakul (2014). Third, it extends the study of closed-end fund investing in 
alternative assets and in emerging markets, adding to work done by Bekaert and Urias (1996). 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous literature 
and develops hypotheses. We introduce the data and methodology in Section 3. In Section 4, 
we report and discuss the empirical results. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section 5. 
 
2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
Closed-end funds are managed by external management companies, implying that the 
delegated decision rights may cause conflicts of interest between fund managers and fund 
shareholders, leading to the classic principal-agent problem. As is generally indicated in the 
principal-agent literature, the primary means to ensure that managers take actions to 
maximize the returns to shareholders is to tie their compensation to the performance of their 
firms. As described in the introduction of this paper, the PPS of a closed-end fund is the 
applicable marginal compensation rate, which is a percentage of the underlying NAV, 
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specified in the management contract each year. In rare cases, closed-end funds compensate 
fund managers with a proportion of the excess performance over a specified benchmark. As 
argued in the theoretical analysis of Admati and Pfleiderer (1997), benchmark-adjusted 
performance compensation is not optimal in terms of incentive alignment and efficient risk 
sharing. Deli (2002) suggests that percentage-of-assets contracts are the norm in the 
closed-end fund industry.  
 
2.1 The Effect of Risk on Fund Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
The primary assumption of principal-agent theory is that incentives are necessary to induce 
costly efforts from agents in situations with information asymmetry (see Mirrless 1974, 1976; 
Ross 1973; Shavell 1979). Accordingly, an efficient management compensation contract 
should make a trade-off between the correct managerial incentives (PPS) to ensure the agent’s 
unobservable effort and the optimal amount of risk sharing by the agent, as derived in 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). They predict that a risk-averse manager is more likely to 
make their compensation less sensitive to the performance of a firm with higher risk. 
 
Moreover, as indicated in Stiglitz (1987) and Eisenhardt (1989), the basic risk aversion 
assumption in agency theory is that agents do not like variability or risk in their compensation. 
Accordingly, Bloom and Milkovich (1998) suggest that a greater amount of firm risk may be 
transferred to the agents by reducing their income and employment stability. They argue that 
when firm risk is higher, greater PPS may become dysfunctional in terms of directing 
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managers’ behavior because it will just impose more risk. Therefore, similarly to Holmstrom 
and Milgrom (1987), they expect that a risk-averse manager’s PPS should be a decreasing 
function of the firm risk or the variance of firm performance. 
 
Other papers have confirmed this prediction, mainly using data on conventional US firms (for 
example, Lambert and Larcker 1987; Kimmel, Kren and Schadewald 1995; Aggarwal and 
Samwick 1999, 2002; Jin 2002; Miller, Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia 2002).  
 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) only emphasize the assumption of the risk-aversion of 
managers. However, uninformed shareholders can only observe the selected projects rather 
than the reasons motivating managers’ selections. This information asymmetry is more severe 
in riskier firms and can induce an adverse selection problem. To motivate risk-averse 
managers to select investment projects optimally (rather than excessively favoring low-risk 
projects), shareholders need to provide greater compensation incentives (higher PPS) to the 
managers of riskier firms.  
 
Following this rationale, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) extend standard agency theory to derive a 
managerial ownership model and predict a positive effect of firm risk on PPS. This is 
supported by Prendergast (2000, 2002) and evidence from Core and Guay (1999, 2002). 
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) also find that stock-return volatility has a positive effect on 
firm PPS. This prediction is also confirmed by the evidence from emerging markets gathered 
in Huang, Wu and Liao (2013), which studies the relationship between equity-based 
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compensation and managerial risk-taking in Chinese listed firms.  
 
Similarly, Deli (2002) points out that it is optimal for the management contract to provide a 
larger applicable marginal compensation rate when it is more difficult to monitor the fund 
manager’s actions or the fund’s performance. Generally, the difficulty of monitoring fund 
performance is captured by a fund’s total investment risk.  
 
To summarize, on the one hand, if standard agency theory applies to the closed-end fund 
industry, then a corresponding null hypothesis is that the fund manager of a closed-end fund 
with higher risk is awarded a lower marginal compensation rate (PPS) in the management 
contract. On the other hand, according to the prediction of the managerial ownership model, a 
closed-end fund’s marginal compensation rate is expected to be in line with its total risk. This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: The fund manager of a closed-end fund with higher risk is awarded a greater marginal 
compensation rate (PPS) in the management contract. 
 
2.2 The Effect of Pay-Performance Sensitivity on Fund Risk 
The evidence on how increased PPS affects managerial risk-taking incentives for 
conventional firms is inconclusive, probably because of the mixed incentives provided by 
PPS. As a consequence, the impact of PPS on firm risk-taking behavior seems to depend on 
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which incentive provided by the PPS dominates (see Low 2009).  
 
On the one hand, increased PPS increases the alignment of interests between managers and 
shareholders, because they share the losses and gains (see Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Higher PPS should therefore increase managers’ efforts and lead to better performance. At the 
same time, John and John (1993) suggest that if higher NPV projects tend to be relatively 
more risky, increased PPS may motivate managers to implement riskier projects. Grinblatt 
and Titman (1989) show that fund managers who hedge their incentive fees try to maximize 
the value of the fees by increasing fund leverage as much as possible. A considerable body of 
theory posits that equity-based compensation is awarded to managers to overcome 
managerial risk aversion and encourage them to invest in high-risk, high-return projects on 
behalf of risk-neutral shareholders (see for example Haugen and Senbet 1981; Smith and 
Stulz 1985; Lambert 1986; Copeland and Weston 1988; Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia 
1991; Hirshleifer and Suh 1992; Murphy 1999; Hemmer, Kim and Verrecchia 1999). In their 
empirical study, Massa and Patgiri (2009) find that the incentives contained in contracts have 
a positive effect on fund risk-taking in the mutual fund industry.  
 
On the other hand, as indicated in Low (2009), increased PPS exposes managers to greater 
firm risk, aggravating the risk aversion problem. Higher PPS leads to a greater reduction in a 
manager’s portfolio value if the firm’s stock price falls. In fact, increased firm risk increases 
the volatility of the manager’s total firm-specific wealth, which includes her portfolio of 
stocks and stock options, firm-specific human capital (see Amihud and Lev 1981; Smith and 
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Stulz 1985), and perquisite consumption (see Williams 1987). Similarly, Carpenter (2000) 
and Ross (2004) show that equity-based compensation does not necessarily lead to increased 
risk-taking because it can increase the sensitivity of the manager’s portfolio to firm stock 
price movement. Moreover, Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) show that although equity-based 
compensation can encourage managers to work hard, it can also affect their attitude toward 
project risk and may lead to too little risk-taking. In empirical research, Lewellen (2006) 
finds that a higher degree of option ownership tends to decrease managers’ preference for 
debt financing. Gormley, Matsa and Milbourn (2010) find evidence that managers whose 
compensation contracts have a high sensitivity to stock price appear to reduce their 
risk-taking in response to the exogenous increase in downside risk. Kempf, Ruenzi and 
Thiele (2009) investigate the risk-taking behavior of mutual funds and find that when 
employment risk is more important than compensation incentives, fund managers with poor 
mid-year performance tend to decrease risk to prevent potential job loss. When employment 
risk is low, compensation incentives dominate, and fund managers with poor mid-year 
performance increase risk to catch up with the mid-year winners. 
 
To a fund manager, if the negative incentive from PPS (higher PPS would increase the 
volatility of her expected utility) outweighs the positive incentive from PPS (higher PPS 
would increase the value of her portfolio of stocks and stock options), a higher marginal 
compensation rate (PPS) is predicted to make the fund manager take a lower level of 
investment risk. However, if the positive incentive from PPS (higher PPS would increase the 
value of her portfolio of stocks and stock options) dominates, then the impact of the PPS 
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specified in the management contract on the level of risk- taking in the closed-end fund 
industry is predicted in the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: A higher marginal compensation rate (PPS) specified in the management contract 
motivates fund managers to take a higher level of investment risk.  
 
Investing in alternative assets or emerging markets will increase the investment risk of 
closed-end funds (see Bekaert and Urias, 1996), and increased investment risk will strengthen 
the relationship between PPS and fund risk. Therefore, we expect that 
 
H3: For closed-end funds investing in alternative assets or emerging markets, the relationship 
between PPS and fund risk is intensified.  
 
2.3 The Endogenous Relationship  
From Hypotheses 1 and 2, it can be seen that a closed-end fund’s PPS included in the 
management contract and its risk-taking behavior seem to be interrelated, or there is an 
endogenous relationship between these two factors. Low (2009) indicates that empirical 
evidence on the effect of equity-based incentives on managerial risk-taking is inconclusive 
mainly because endogeneity issues often cloud the interpretation of the relation between 
equity-based incentives and firm risk. The endogenous relationships that emerge among 
governance mechanisms and managerial decisions in the extant literature are normally 
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addressed through simultaneous equation models. For instance, Coles, Daniel and Naveen 
(2006) examine how managerial incentives and investment and financial policies are jointly 
determined. Billett, King and Mauer (2007) investigate the endogeneity between leverage and 
bondholder governance represented by debt covenants. John, Litov and Yeung (2008) and 
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2009) examine the interactive relationship between management 
entrenchment and investment policy. John and Litov (2009) study the endogeneity between 
managerial entrenchment and leverage. King and Wen (2011) test the interactive relationship 
between shareholder governance, bondholder governance and managerial investment policy. 
Thus, in order to avoid spurious inferences and to isolate causation, the empirical design of 
this paper needs to disentangle how fund PPS affects risk-taking behavior from how fund risk 
affects the fund PPS specified in the management contract each year. Therefore, a critical part 
of this paper involves accounting for how fund PPS and fund risk-taking behavior are jointly 
determined, which is achieved with simultaneous equation models.  
 
In addition, in the previous literature, conclusions regarding the risk-taking incentives linked 
to equity-based compensation are often inferred through financial decisions and investment 
policies, instead of firm risk itself. Low (2009) discusses how such financial and investment 
policies often affect managerial incentives in complicated ways, making it difficult for 
researchers to interpret results solely in terms of risk considerations. Therefore, in this paper, 
we examine fund risk directly to summarize the net effect of all managerial risk-taking 
activities, including some that cannot easily be measured by the econometrician, so as to 
provide a more accurate portrayal of fund managers’ risk-taking behavior. 
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3 Data and Methodology 
 
The management compensation contract information contained in Morningstar’s fund 
database starts from the year 2006. Thus, two years of data are available before the financial 
crisis of 2008. To include representative years both before and after the financial crisis, the 
sample period studied in this paper is from the year 2006 to the year 2009. The sample 
includes the population of US closed-end funds traded on the New York Stock Exchange, the 
American Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ Stock Exchange at any time between 2006 and 
2009. There are 578 closed-end funds in 2006, 573 in 2007, 607 in 2008 and 593 in 2009, 
making a final panel dataset of 2,351 fund-year observations. To examine the relationship 
between fund PPS and fund risk-taking behavior, we collect all relevant data from 
Morningstar’s fund database. The data include the applicable marginal compensation rate 
(PPS) and the type of management contract (single or multiple compensation rates) for each 
fund in each sample year, the monthly NAV returns over each sample year and the previous 
year, the value of the total expenses of each fund during each sample year, the monthly NAV 
of each fund during each sample year, the value of the sales and purchases of underlying 
investments by each fund in each sample year, and the IPO date and investment policy of 
each fund.   
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3.1 Simultaneous Analysis of the Relationship 
A closed-end fund’s PPS as specified in the management contract, and its risk-taking 
behavior, seem to be interrelated. Following the lead of the previous literature illustrated in 
Section 2.3, it is critical to account for the endogenous relationship between these two factors 
by applying simultaneous equation models to investigate how they are jointly determined.  
 
We estimate the system simultaneously using the instrumental variables approach. The 
structural set-up is described in equations (1) and (2) below: 
 
Fund PPS it = 1 it Predicted fund return volatility it + 2 Alternative dummyit *Predicted 
fund return volatility it + 3 Emerging dummy it *Predicted fund return 
volatility it + 4 Alternative dummy it + 5 Emerging dummy it + 6 Linear 
contract dummy it + 7 Expense ratio it + 8 Turnover 
ratio it 9 Lnsize it + 10 Fund age it + 11 Median PPS it + 12 Year 
dummies it + 13 Segment dummies it + it               (1) 
 
where i represents the fund. The dependent variable is the applicable marginal compensation 
rate (PPS) of the fund during each sample year. For a linear contract, the PPS is the single 
compensation rate specified in the contract each year, expressed as a percentage. For a 
concave contract, Coles, Suay and Woodbury (2000) state that although different marginal 
rates of compensation apply to different levels of NAV, only one such rate is particularly 
relevant, and it is defined as the applicable marginal compensation rate. This applicable 
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marginal compensation rate is the compensation rate specified in the contract that 
corresponds to the interval NAV that equals the most recent year-end NAV as reported in 
either the proxy statement or the annual report for the corresponding year, expressed as a 
percentage. They argue that, as a practical matter, this applicable marginal compensation rate 
is a good measure of PPS, which is the percentage of a relatively “small” change in NAV that 
will be captured or lost by the fund manager. To test the first hypothesis, we measure the total 
investment risk of the fund, using the standard deviation of the monthly NAV returns over the 
sample year, expressed as a percentage. To test Hypothesis 3, we control for interaction terms 
of investment risk with both an alternative dummy and an emerging dummy. The alternative 
dummy equals one if the closed-end fund invests in alternative assets, and zero otherwise. 
The emerging dummy equals one if the closed-end fund invests in emerging markets, and 
zero otherwise.  
 
We also control for other factors that may affect the fund’s applicable marginal compensation 
rate. Specifically, different contract types may have different levels of applicable marginal 
compensation rates. The linear contract dummy is set to one if the management contract 
contains a single marginal compensation rate and zero if it contains a series of marginal 
compensation rates, declining as the fund size increases. 
 
Coles et al. (2000) suggest that higher costs may reflect higher management quality or that 
more effort is required to collect the information needed to make value- increasing portfolio 
decisions. Accordingly, fund expenses are predicted to be positively related to the fund’s 
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applicable marginal compensation rate (or, equally, to the PPS). We measure fund expenses 
by the expense ratio, which is total expenses as a percentage of average NAV during the 
sample year. 
 
Deli (2002) states that, in addition to aligning the interests of the fund manager and the 
shareholders, marginal compensation rates are used as a mechanism for signaling the fund 
manager’s marginal product. He implies that the level of portfolio trading activity is 
positively related to the quality of management information and therefore directly related to 
the marginal product of the fund manager. As a consequence, the marginal compensation 
rates for funds with higher turnover are expected to be greater than those for funds with lower 
turnover (see Coles et al. 2000; Deli 2002; Cashman 2010). The turnover ratio is the absolute 
value of the difference between sales and purchases of underlying investments by the fund, as 
a percentage of average NAV during the sample year. 
 
Deli (2002) implies that the negative relationship between fund size and fund PPS is 
consistent with economies of scale being passed along to investors, while a reduction in the 
management’s marginal product is proven by Cashman (2010) to make PPS an inverse 
function of fund size. We measure fund size by Lnsize, which is the logarithm of the average 
monthly NAV of the fund during the sample year. 
 
Coles et al. (2000) argue that new funds are expected to attract more attention and effort from 
managers, leading to a higher marginal product and therefore greater marginal compensation 
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rates than old funds. Accordingly, we control for a fund age variable that equals the number 
of trading days between the end of the sample year and the fund IPO date, divided by 250 
(the approximate number of trading days in one year). 
 
Kini and Williams (2012) argue that each industry may set a standard compensation structure 
for all firms in that industry. They find that the industry-median CEO PPS positively affects 
the CEO PPS of individual firms. Accordingly, in this study, the segment-median PPS (which 
is defined below) is predicted to be positively related to the fund PPS. The segment-median 
PPS is the median manager’s applicable marginal compensation rate for all funds in the same 
segment (foreign bond sector, foreign equity sector, domestic equity sector or domestic bond 
sector) during each sample year. 
 
Finally, we control for year dummies for the sample years of 2006, 2007 and 2009 to 
examine year effects, using the year 2008 as the base to avoid multicollinearity. Also, we use 
three segment dummy variables – for the foreign bond sector, the domestic equity sector and 
the domestic bond sector – to control for different fund investment policies, using 
investments in foreign equity securities as the base to avoid multicollinearity. Table 1 
provides definitions of all the variables used in the analyses. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
The independent variable of predicted fund return volatility is computed by estimating a 
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first-stage regression in which fund return volatility is the dependent variable and the 
independent variables include all the exogenous variables from the second-stage fund PPS 
regression and the chosen instrument. The predicted value of fund return volatility is then 
employed as an independent variable in lieu of its actual value in the second-stage regression. 
Here, the chosen instrument is the segment-median fund return volatility, which is the median 
standard deviation of monthly NAV returns across all funds in the same segment over the 
sample year in question, expressed as a percentage. Roberts and Whited (2011) suggest that 
the most important characteristic for a valid instrument is that it will affect the second-stage 
variable only through its effect on the first-stage endogenous variable, based purely on 
economic arguments. Accordingly, we believe that the segment-median fund return volatility 
is a valid instrument because the segment may set a standard for the return volatility of any 
fund in that segment (with the same type of investment policy). At the same time, it is 
unlikely that this segment- level instrument will have a direct impact on fund PPS after 
adjusting for segment and year effects. Moreover, this segment-median return volatility is not 
predicted to be affected by any individual fund’s decisions and, therefore, it is more likely to 
be orthogonal to the residuals of the second-stage regression than any of the fund-level 
instruments. Despite these arguments, we still examine the validity of the instrument using an 
F-test to ensure that the F-statistic associated with the endogenous variable in the first-stage 
regression is statistically significant. 
 
Fund return volatility it = 1 it Predicted PPS it + 2  Fund return 
volatility )1( ti + 3 Alternative dummy it *Predicted PPS it + 4 Emerging 
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dummy it *Predicted PPS it + 5 Alternative dummy it + 6 Emerging 
dummy it + 7 Linear contract dummy it + 8 Expense 
ratio it 9 Turnover ratio it + 10 Lnsize it + 11 Fund age it + 12 Median 
fund return volatility it + 13 Year dummies it + 14 Segment 
dummies it + it                              (2) 
 
where the dependent variable is the standard deviation of monthly NAV returns over each 
sample year, as a percentage.  To test Hypothesis 2, we control for other factors that may 
influence the fund return volatility. Massa and Patgiri (2009) find that mutual fund return 
volatility is positively affected by lagged fund return volatility, fund expenses, turnover ratio 
and fund size. They find that fund age has a mixed effect on return volatility. Mutual funds 
with linear contracts are shown to be more likely to have higher fund return volatility than 
mutual funds with concave contracts. As discussed above, the segment-median fund return 
volatility is predicted to set the standard for the return volatility of any given fund in the same 
segment and, therefore, is expected to be positively related to fund return volatility. Finally, 
we include both year and segment dummies as in equation (1). To test Hypothesis 3, we also 
control for interaction terms of fund PPS with both an alternative dummy and an emerging 
dummy. All control variables are defined as above. 
 
In this model, fund PPS is first regressed against all the exogenous variables in the system 
and the instrument, and then the predicted values are computed. The instrument used is the 
segment-median PPS and which were shown previously to pass all the relevance and validity 
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conditions for such instrument. Next, fund return volatility is regressed against both the 
predicted fund PPS and the other control variables, as in equation (2).  
 
4 Empirical Findings 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for all variables used in the empirical analysis. Panel 
A shows the measure of fund investment risk. The average value of fund return volatility is 
6.09%, with a median of 3.209%. The maximum fund return volatility is 2818.707%.  
 
Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for the measure of fund PPS. The mean and median 
applicable marginal compensation rates show that the management contracts of US 
closed-end funds specify average and median annual rates of 0.684% and 0.65% of the 
corresponding underlying NAV as the compensation for fund managers. This implies that a 
$1,000 increase in the fund’s NAV will increase the fund manager’s compensatio n by $6.84 
on average, with a median increase of $6.5. These numbers are higher than the $5.46 mean 
and $5 median found by Coles et al. (2000), which are also related to US closed-end funds 
but are based on earlier data covering the period from 1978 to 1991. The results found here 
are similar, though, to the estimate of CEO PPS of $6.59 found by Aggarwal and Samwick 
(1999) for large US public companies, using data for the period from 1993 to 1996. In the 
present study, the maximum PPS found was $18.6 for the Taiwan Greater China fund, which 
invests most of its assets in the equity securities of foreign companies. 
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Regarding the control variables in Panel C, the mean values of the alternative dummy and the 
emerging dummy suggest that, out of the 2,351 fund-year observations, around 19.1% invest 
in alternative assets and 5.9% invest in emerging markets. The mean value of the linear 
contract dummy variable indicates that, out of the 2,351 fund-year observations, 66.2% have 
a linear management contract with a single compensation rate and 33.8% have a concave 
management contract with multiple compensation rates. The average values of the other 
variables are 4.93% for the lagged fund return volatility, 1.253% for the expense ratio, 
48.672% for the turnover ratio, $510.941 million for the size, 19,524 for Lnsize and 11.435 
years for the fund age. On average, the segment-median level of fund return volatility is 
3.664%, and that of fund PPS is 0.675%.  
 
Table 2 presents the results of the univariate analysis on the mean values of the two main 
variables, fund PPS and fund return volatility. To examine how fund return volatility affects 
fund PPS, we compare the mean values of fund PPS for two subsamples, formed by taking 
those funds with return volatility below and, respectively, above the median. To examine how 
fund PPS affects fund return volatility, we compare the mean values of fund return volatility 
for two subsamples based on PPS (those funds with below and above the median fund PPS, 
respectively). The tests show that the mean PPS of the sample with fund return volatility 
below the median is significantly smaller than that of the above-median-volatility sample, at a 
1% significance level. Therefore, fund PPS seems to be positively affected by fund return 
volatility, which supports Hypothesis 1. The mean fund return volatility of the sample with 
22 
 
PPS below the median is also significantly lower than that of the above-median-PPS sample, 
at a 5% significance level. This finding apparently confirms Hypothesis 2 – that fund PPS has 
a positive effect on fund risk. The univariate tests consider each of the variables 
independently. However, the influences on both fund PPS and fund risk are very likely to be 
simultaneously related to all of the other control variables. It is therefore difficult to fully 
examine the hypotheses through univariate analysis alone.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 3 reports the correlation coefficients between the independent variables employed in 
the multivariate analysis. The correlations between segment-median PPS and fund PPS, 
between alternative dummy*PPS and segment-median PPS, between emerging dummy*PPS 
and segment-median PPS, and between segment-median PPS and segment-median fund 
return volatility are significantly high, but in each of these pairs the two variables are not 
tested in the same regression. All correlations between pairs of variables used in the same 
regression are below 0.3. This means that the detection tolerance of each pair of variables 
used in the same regression is larger than 0.7 and the variation inflation factor (VIF) of each 
pair is smaller than 1.429. O'Brien (2007) proves that a tolerance of less than 0.2 and/or a 
VIF of five or more indicates a multicollinearity problem. Therefore, there seem to be no 
multicollinearity problems for any of the independent variables used in the same regression in 
this study. The empirical results of the multivariate analyses are discussed in the following 
subsection.  
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[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4.2 Simultaneous Equation 
As discussed in the literature review and methodology sections, it is critical to account for the 
endogenous relationship between fund PPS and fund risk by applying simultaneous equation 
models to investigate how they affect one another.  
 
Table 4 shows the results of the simultaneous equation models that jointly examine the 
determinants of fund PPS and the level of fund risk for the full sample of 2,351 fund-year 
observations. We report both the coefficients and the significance levels for all variables. For 
the simultaneous examinations, we use contemporaneous values for fund return volatility, 
fund PPS and all the control variables. The two models in the table are estimated 
simultaneously using the instrumental variables approach, following equations (1) and (2). 
The predicted values of fund PPS and fund return volatility are computed by regressing 
against all the exogenous variables in the system and their instruments. The instrumental 
variables are the segment-median PPS for fund PPS and the segment-median return volatility 
for fund return volatility.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
24 
 
In the simultaneous equations system, predicted fund PPS has a significantly positive effect 
on fund return volatility. A 1% increase in PPS would increase fund return volatility by 
5.239% (8.834% of its standard deviation). This further confirms Hypothesis 2. Consistent 
with Hypothesis 3, this enhance would increase to 12.607% for funds investing in alternative 
assets, to 11.607% for funds investing in emerging markets, and to 18.975% for funds 
investing in alternative assets in emerging markets. Predicted fund return volatility has a 
positive impact on fund PPS, and fund PPS would increase by 0.012% (4.33% of its standard 
deviation) with a 1% increase in fund return volatility. This result therefore supports 
Hypothesis 1. A 1% increase in fund return volatility would increase the fund PPS by 0.014% 
(5.05% of its standard deviation) for funds investing in alternative assets, by 0.013% (4.69% 
of its standard deviation) for funds investing in emerging markets, and by 0.015% (5.42% of 
its standard deviation) for funds investing in alternative assets in emerging markets. Again, 
this result supports Hypothesis 3. In addition, a 1% increase in the expense ratio or turnover 
ratio would increase fund PPS by 0.15% (54.15% of its standard deviation) or 0.001% 
(0.36% of its standard deviation), respectively. A 0.1% increase in the segment-median PPS 
would increase fund PPS by 0.074% (26.71% of its standard deviation). A one-unit decrease 
in Lnsize and a one-year reduction in fund age would increase fund PPS by 0.013% (4.69% 
of its standard deviation) and 0.002% (0.72% of its standard deviation), respectively. To 
summarize, the results of the simultaneous equation models testing how the level of fund 
return volatility and fund PPS are jointly determined are consistent with Hypotheses 1 to 3.  
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4.3 Robustness checks 
PPS and return volatility are determined simultaneously and are highly auto-correlated, 
leading to the conclusion that lagged PPS is endogenous to current return volatility (or lagged 
return volatility is endogenous to current PPS). This conclusion is supported by the results of 
the endogeneity tests on lagged fund return volatility in Model 1 of Appendix Table 1 and on 
lagged PPS in Model 1 of Appendix Table 2, of the Wu-Hausman F-test and the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-square test. Previous literature, such as Kini and Williams (2012), 
uses lagged independent variables to alleviate, but does not eliminate, issues related to 
endogeneity in the OLS approach. They also use both the 2SLS regression approach (lagged 
independent variables) and the simultaneous equation approach (contemporaneous 
independent variables) to better account for the endogeneity.  
 
Following this, we also conduct 2SLS regressions as a robustness check in the appendix. The 
results are consistent with those from simultaneous equations. The segment-median lagged 
fund return volatility (median standard deviation of monthly NAV returns across all funds in 
the same segment over the previous sample year) is used as an instrument in Model 2 of 
Appendix Table 1. The F-test statistic on the validity of the instrumental variable is 18.725 
and is statistically significant, proving that the instrument is valid. The segment-median 
lagged fund PPS (median applicable marginal compensation rate across all funds in the same 
segment during the previous sample year) is used as an instrument in Model 2 of Appendix 
Table 2. The F-test statistic for the validity of the instrumental variable is 203.56 and is 
highly statistically significant. This proves that the instrument is valid.  
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5 Conclusions 
 
This paper takes advantage of the transparent PPS information in management contracts for 
closed-end funds and studies how fund risk-taking behavior and fund PPS are interrelated for 
the closed-end fund industry. We use simultaneous equation models based on a sample of 
2,351 fund-year observations of US closed-end funds traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange, the American Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ Stock Exchange be tween 2006 
and 2009. We find that they positively influence each other. Moreover, the positive 
relationship between fund return volatility and fund PPS is more intensive for closed-end 
funds making alternative investments or investing in emerging markets.  
 
This study contributes to the literature on management incentives, decisions on risk-taking 
behavior and corporate governance as a whole. The positive effect of fund risk on fund PPS 
supports the predictions of the managerial ownership model in Demsetz and Lehn (1985), but 
is contrary to the implications of the standard principal-agent model in Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1987). Fund risk-taking behavior is positively affected by fund PPS, which 
indicates that, out of the two incentives provided by PPS, the increase in the value of a 
closed-end fund manager’s compensation outweighs the negative effect increased volatility 
has on her expected utility.  
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Cumming et al. (2015) find that mutual fund outsourcing could have an impact on fund risk.  
Specifically, they find that outsourcing advisor services is associated with both greater fund 
risk and risk-adjusted performance. Future research could examine the relationship between 
PPS and outsourcing services among mutual funds.  
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
This table provides definitions and descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in the empirical analys is for the full sample of 2,351 
fund-year observations from 2006 to 2009. 
Variable  
Name 
Definition Obs Mean Median Std  
Dev. 
Min Max 
Panel A: Measures of investment risk 
Vol Standard deviation of monthly net asset 2351  6.090  3.209  59.306  0.000  2818.707  
 value returns over each sample year; in (%)       
Variable  
Name 
Definition Obs Mean Median Std  
Dev. 
Min Max 
Panel B: Measure of fund pay-performance sensitivity  
PPS For a linear contract, it is the single 
compensation rate specified in the contract 
each year, expressed as a percentage. For a 
concave contract, it is the compensation 
rate specified in the contract that 
corresponds to the NAV interval that 
contains the most recent year-end NAV, as  
reported in either the proxy statement or 
the annual report for the corresponding 
year, expressed as a percentage.  
2351  0.684  0.650  0.277  0.000  1.860  
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Variable 
Name 
Definition Obs Mean Median Std 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Panel C: Control variables 
AT Equals one if the closed-end fund invests in assets 
rather than equity, and equals zero if the fund 
invests in traditional equity. 
2351  0.191  0.000  0.393  0.000  1.000  
       
EM Equals one if the closed-end fund invests in 
emerging markets, and equals zero if the fund 
invests in developed markets.  
2351  0.059  0.000  0.235  0.000  1.000  
       
LIC Equals one if the management contract contains 2351  0.662  1.000  0.473  0.000  1.000  
 a single marginal compensation rate, and equals 
zero if the contract contains a series of marginal  
compensation rates declining with the increase of 
the fund size. 
      
       
       
       
Lagvol Standard deviation of monthly net asset value 
returns over the previous year; in (%) 
2351  4.930  1.893  59.756  0.000  2818.707  
       
EXR Total expenses as a percentage of net asset value 2351  1.253  1.160  0.535  0.110  8.160  
 during the sample year; in (%)       
TNR Absolute value of the difference between sales and 
purchases as a percentage of average monthly 
NAV for the sample year; in (%).  
2351  48.672  31.000  64.029  0.600  999.000  
       
         
Size Average monthly net asset value of the fund  2351  510.941  310.503  609.074  0.000  7667.545  
 during the sample year; in ($ million)       
Lnsize Logarithm of the average monthly net asset value 
of the fund during the sample year. 
2351  19.524  19.562  1.059  15.504  22.760  
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Age Number of years since the fund’s inception. 2351  11.435  9.572  10.187  0.016  85.492  
Mvol Median standard deviation of monthly net asset  
value returns of all funds in the same segment over 
each sample year; in (%) 
2351  3.664  3.499  2.505  1.011  10.733  
       
       
MPPS Median manager’s applicable marginal 
compensation rate of all funds in the same segment 
during each sample year; in (%) 
2351  0.675  0.550  0.191  0.520  1.000  
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Table 2 Univariate analysis  
This table performs a univariate analys is on the mean values of the main variables in this paper: fund PPS and fund return volatility. It compares the mean values of 
fund PPS between two subsamples: with below and above the median value of fund return volatility. It also compares the mean values of fund return volatility 
between two subsamples: with below and above the median value of fund PPS. The difference in means and p-values for the standard t-test of differences between 
the means of two unpaired samples are reported in the last two columns of the table, respectively. The definitions of these two main variables are shown in Table 1. 
   Difference P-value of 
Variable Obs Mean  in Mean difference in 
Mean 
PPS:     
Fund return volatility below 
median 
1175  0.60  -0.165 0.000  
Fund return volatility above 
median 
1175  0.77    
     
Fund return volatility:     
PPS below median 1175  5.61  -0.907 0.036  
PPS above median 1175  6.52    
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Table 3 Correlation matrix 
This table reports the correlation coefficients between the independent variables used in the multivariate analysis. Median PPS and PPS are significantly highly 
correlated at 0.664. Alternative dummy*PPS and median PPS are highly correlated at 0.601. Emerging dummy*PPS and median PPS are correlated at 0.561.The 
correlation between median PPS and median fund return volatility is significant at 0.686. However, in none of these pairs are the two variables used in the same 
regression for the multivariate analysis. All other correlations are below 0.3. The detection-tolerance of every pair of variables is larger than 0.7, and the variation 
inflation factor (VIF) of any pair of variables is smaller than 1.429. This means there is no multicollinearity problem for any of the independent variables used in the 
same regression. All variables are defined in Table 1. Bold correlations indicate significance at the 1% level.  
 
Variables Volt PPSt ATt 
×PPSt 
EMt 
×PPSt 
ATt 
×Volt 
EMt 
×Volt 
ATt EMt LICt EXRt TNRt Lnsizet Aget Volt-1 Mvolt MPPSt 
Volt 1.000                
PPSt 0.011 1.000               
ATt×PPSt 0.002 0.038 1.000              
EMt×PPSt 0.007 0.045 0.122 1.000             
ATt×Volt 0.045 0.001 0.153 0.006 1.000            
EMt×Volt 0.020 0.002 0.132 0.009 0.061 1.000           
ATt 0.001 0.030 0.065 0.010 0.031 0.021 1.000          
EMt 0.007 0.016 0.031 0.050 0.015 0.012 0.009 1.000         
LICt -0.022 0.101 0.082 -0.099 0.080 -0.123 0.060 -0.098 1.000        
EXRt 0.006 0.127 0.257 0.123 0.255 0.102 0.216 0.112 0.146 1.000       
TNRt -0.005 0.201 0.102 0..056 0.040 0.049 0.103 0.057 0.120 0.123 1.000      
Lnsizet 0.008 0.138 0.123 0.026 0.026 0.167 0.118 0.027 0.234 -0.223 0.098 1.000     
Aget -0.014 -0.156 -0.153 0.092 -0.029 0.088 0.014 0.093 -0.214 -0.054 -0.084 0.018 1.000    
Volt-1 0.002 0.010 0.001 0.012 0.011 0.016 -0.001 0.012 -0.230 0.004 -0.004 0.014 -0.007 1.000   
Mvolt 0.029 0.159 0.155 0.247 0.274 0.102 0.131 0.235 -0.007 0.195 0.183 0.091 0.022 0.013 1.000  
MPPSt 0.013 0.664 0.601 0.561 0.260 0.213 0.235 0.263 0.023 0.246 0.247 0.213 -0.003 0.017 0.686 1.000 
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Table 4 Simultaneous equation estimation  
This table presents the results of simultaneous equation models that examine how the fund PPS and the 
level of fund risk are jointly determined, for the full sample of 2,351 fund-year observations from 2006 to 
2009. The dependent variable in the first regression is fund return volatility, and in the second regression it 
is fund PPS. Predicted fund PPS is estimated by regressing on the instrument of segment-median PPS and 
other exogenous variables. Predicted fund return volatility is estimated by regressing on the instrument of 
segment-median return volatility and other exogenous variables. The first regression is based on equation 
(5) and the second on equation (6). All variables are defined in Table 1. We report coefficients and 
significance levels for each model. 
Estimation type Simultaneous equations (3SLS) 
Dependent variable Volt PPSt   
 Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Prevolt    0.012 0.022 
PrePPSt  5.239 0.032   
ATt×Prevolt    0.002 0.039 
EMt×Prevolt    0.001 0.047 
ATt×PrePPSt  7.368 0.027   
EMt×PrePPSt  6.368 0.030   
ATt  1.946 0.027 0.079 0.059 
EMt  1.179 0.020 0.061 0.088 
LICt  0.497  0.148 0.005  0.960 
EXRt 1.910 0.002 0.150 0.008 
TNRt -0.001  0.224 0.001 0.005 
Lnsizet 0.602 0.007 -0.013 0.006 
Aget -0.062  0.650 -0.002 0.005 
Volt-1 0.001  0.592   
Mvolt  1.019 0.003   
MPPSt   0.743 0.007 
Year2006 -1.713 0.035 0.043 0.717 
Year2007 -1.213 0.028 0.020 0.925 
Year2009 -0.592 0.061 0.003 0.972 
Foreignbond -0.574 0.076 0.121 0.579 
Domesticequity 0.063 0.690 0.099 0.541 
Domesticbond -0.446 0.136 0.463 0.280 
Constant -13.588  0.683 -0.360 0.002 
No.Observation 2351   2351   
Adjusted 2R  
0.513   0.679   
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Appendix Table 1 
Risk effect on fund management pay-performance sensitivity 
This table presents the OLS regression and 2SLS regression results of the risk effect on fund PPS for the 
full sample of 2,351 fund-year observations from 2006 to 2009. The dependent variable is the applicable 
marginal compensation rate denoted in the management contract as a percentage. The Wu-Hausman F-test 
and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-squared test are used to examine the endogeneity of lagged fund return 
volatility. A 2SLS regression is used to address the endogeneity problem of the OLS regression. The 
instrument used in the 2SLS regression is segment-median lagged fund return volatility (median standard 
deviation of monthly NAV returns across all funds in the same segment over the previous sample year); the 
instrument’s validity is examined using an F-test, and the results are presented in the lower part of the table. 
Model 1 is based on equation (1) and Model 2 on equation (2). All variables are defined in Table 1. We 
report coefficients and p-values for each model.  
Dependent variable: PPSt   
 OLS IV(2SLS) 
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 
 Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Volt-1 0.002 0.076   
ATt×Volt-1 0.001 0.082   
EMt×Volt-1 0.001 0.090   
Prevolt-1   0.005 0.028 
ATt×Prevolt-1   0.002 0.036 
EMt×Prevolt-1   0.001 0.045 
ATt  0.024 0.051 0.056 0.079 
EMt  0.016 0.067 0.048 0.083 
LICt  0.001  0.346 0.002  0.496 
EXRt 0.096 0.000 0.123 0.021 
TNRt 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Lnsizet -0.013 0.000 -0.017 0.004 
Aget -0.003 0.000 -0.004 0.035 
MPPSt 0.313 0.000 0.198 0.033 
Year2006 -0.001 0.996 -0.002 0.980 
Year2007 0.008 0.451 0.057 0.609 
Year2009 -0.001 0.923 -0.056 0.643 
Foreignbond -0.051 0.068 -0.068 0.681 
Domesticequity 0.032 0.080 0.032 0.759 
Domesticbond 0.064 0.300 0.054 0.876 
Constant 0.012  0.210 0.102  0.748 
No.Observation 2351   2351   
Adjusted 2R  
0.586   0.612   
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Tests of endogeneity of Volt-1 for OLS 
Model 1 
   
H0: Regressor is 
exogenous 
    
Wu-Hausman F test:            5.367  
F(1, 2336)                                                
P-value = 0.023 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test:   5.724  
Chi-sq(1)                             
P-value = 0.021 
F-test on the validity of the instrument used 
for IV (2SLS) Model 2 
   
H0: The instrument variable (Mvolt-1) is 
invalid 
   
F-statistic:    18.725     
P-value:     0.000         
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Appendix Table 2 
The effect of fund management pay-performance sensitivity on the 
level of risk-taking 
This table presents the OLS regression and 2SLS regression results for the impact of fund PPS on 
the level of risk-taking for the full sample of 2,351 fund-year observations from 2006 to 2009. 
The dependent variable is the volatility of fund investment performance, as a percentage. The 
Wu-Hausman F-test and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-squared test are used to examine the 
endogeneity of lagged fund PPS. A 2SLS regression is used to address the endogeneity problem 
of the OLS regression. The instrument used in the 2SLS regression is segment-median lagged 
fund PPS (median applicable marginal compensation rate across all funds in the same segment 
during the previous sample year); the instrument’s validity is examined using an F-test, and the 
results are presented in the lower part of the table. Model 1 is based on equation (3) and Model 2 
on equation (4). All variables are defined in Table 1. We report coefficients and p-values for each 
model.  
Dependent variable: Volt 
 OLS IV(2SLS) 
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 
 Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
PPSt-1 1.276 0.056   
ATt×PPSt-1 1.106 0.068   
EMt×PPSt-1 0.688 0.088   
PrePPSt-1   3.601 0.022 
ATt×PrePPSt-1   2.917 0.027 
EMt×PrePPSt-1   1.389 0.016 
ATt  0.745 0.068 0.812 0.087 
EMt  0.173 0.092 0.233 0.088 
Volt-1 0.000  0.985 0.000  0.966 
LICt  0.084  0.141 0.143  0.259 
EXRt 0.836 0.008 2.150 0.004 
TNRt -0.001 0.871 -0.003  0.890 
Lnsizet 0.072 0.004 0.315 0.005 
Aget -0.012 0.303 -0.021  0.575 
Mvolt  0.959 0.004 1.056 0.004 
Year2006 -0.749 0.044 -1.042 0.059 
Year2007 -0.219 0.081 -0.575 0.071 
Year2009 -0.181 0.072 -0.313 0.065 
Foreignbond -0.254 0.082 -1.841 0.877 
Domesticequity 0.350 0.584 0.481 0.545 
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Domesticbond -0.495 0.617 0.837 0.959 
Constant -10.849 0.095 -10.643 0.049 
No.Observation 2351   2351   
Adjusted 2R  
0.415   0.713   
Tests of endogeneity of PPSt-1 for OLS Model  
H0: Regressor is exogenous  
Wu-Hausman F test: 5.126  F(1, 2335)                                                     P-value = 0.031 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 5.232 
Chi-sq(1)                                   
P-value = 0.025 
F-test on the validity of the instrument used for IV (2SLS) Model 2 
H0: The instrument variable (MPPSt-1) is invalid 
F-statistic:        203.56              
P-value:          0.000            
 
 
